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T O O L S
Key Points
· The nonobvious interrelationships among elements 
in a complex system often thwart people’s best 
intentions to sustainably improve system perfor-
mance.
· The complex, nonlinear problems that most foun-
dations address can be solved most effectively 
by thinking systemically instead of linearly about 
these problems.
· Systems thinking offers a range of analytic tools to 
improve our capacity to think systemically, includ-
ing ways to distinguish problem symptoms from 
root causes, reinforcing and balancing feedback, 
system archetypes, mental models, and system 
purpose and goals.
· Applying these tools enables us to target high-
leverage interventions that can lead to sustainable, 
system-wide improvement.
· These tools can be applied using a five-step 
implementation process.
Introduction
In the summer of 2006, a group of local founda-
tions supported the leaders of Calhoun County, 
Michigan (population 100,000), to develop a 10-
year plan to end homelessness (Stroh & Good-
man, 2007). The agreement forged by govern-
ment officials at the municipal, state, and federal 
levels — along with business leaders, service 
providers, and homeless people themselves — 
came after years of leadership inertia and conflict 
among service providers regarding what needed 
to be done to solve the problem instead of just 
cope with it. Moreover, the plan signaled a para-
digmatic shift in how the community viewed the 
role of temporary shelters and other emergency 
response services. Rather than be seen as part 
of the solution to homelessness, these programs 
came to be viewed as one of the key obstacles to 
ending it.
The plan won state funding, and a new execu-
tive director supported by a multi-sector board 
began steering implementation. Service providers 
who had previously worked independently and 
competed for foundation and public monies came 
together in new ways. One dramatic example was 
that they all voted unanimously to reallocate HUD 
funding from one service provider’s transitional 
housing program to a permanent supportive 
housing program run by another provider. Jennifer 
Schrand, who chaired the planning process and is 
currently Manager of Outreach and Development 
for Legal Services of South Central Michigan, ob-
served, “I learned the difference between changing 
a particular system and leading systemic change.”
Why was this intervention so successful when 
many other attempts by foundations to improve 
the quality of people’s lives fall short? For example, 
urban renewal programs of the 1960s were backed 
by good intentions and significant funding, yet 
they failed to produce the changes envisioned for 
them. Moreover, the programs often made living 
conditions worse — leading to such outcomes as 
David Peter Stroh, M.CP.
Leveraging Grantmaking: Understanding 
the Dynamics of Complex Social Systems
Stroh
110 THE FoundationReview
abandoned public housing projects and increased 
unemployment that resulted from apparently 
successful job training programs (Forrester, 1969). 
Stories of well-intentioned yet counterproductive 
solutions continue to be numerous, as we learn 
that temporary shelters can undermine communi-
ty efforts to end homelessness, food aid can lead to 
increased starvation, and drug busts can increase 
drug-related crime. In other cases, short-term 
successes are frequently not sustained and the 
problem mysteriously reappears, as, for example, 
when civic leaders invested in programs to reduce 
urban youth crime or international donors funded 
the drilling of wells in African villages to improve 
access to potable water.
The planning project to end homelessness com-
bined two significant interventions: a proactive 
community development effort engaging leaders in 
all sectors along with homeless people themselves, 
and a systems diagnosis that enabled all stakehold-
ers to agree on a shared picture of why homeless-
ness persisted and where the leverage lay in ending 
it. The purpose of this two-part article is to focus 
on the less commonly used intervention: applying 
systems thinking to help foundations make better 
decisions about how to use their limited grantmak-
ing resources for highest, sustainable impact. Part 
1 addresses two key questions:
Why are good intentions and obvious solutions •	
not enough to solve the chronic, complex prob-
lems many foundations seek to address? 
Where are the leverage points for improving •	
system performance in sustainable ways?
Part 2 of the article will focus on how foundations 
can increase the return on their social invest-
ments by aligning their grantmaking system with 
the dynamics of the social systems they seek to 
improve.
The Nonobvious Nature of Complex 
Systems
Lewis Thomas, the award-winning medical essay-
ist, observed, “When you are confronted by any 
complex social system … with things about it that 
you’re dissatisfied with and anxious to fix, you 
cannot just step in and set about fixing with much 
hope of helping. This is one of the sore discour-
agements of our time” (Thomas, 1979, p. 110). 
The homelessness and other stories above all 
epitomize this poignant insight. They share other 
specific characteristics:
The solutions that were implemented seemed •	
obvious at the time and in fact often helped 
achieve the desired results in the short term. For 
example, it is natural to provide shelter, even 
temporary, for people who are homeless or of-
fer food aid when people are starving.
The longer-term impacts of the same solu-•	
tion tend to neutralize short-term gains or 
even make things worse in the long term. For 
example, the temporary shelters provided by 
Calhoun County led to the ironic consequence 
of reducing the visibility of its homeless popu-
lation, which reduced community pressure to 
solve the problem permanently.
The negative consequences of these solutions •	
are unintentional; everyone is doing the best 
they can with what they know at the time.
How can the interactions over time among ele-
ments in a complex system transform the best of 
intentions into such disappointing results? The 
reason lies in part because of our tendency to ap-
ply linear thinking to complex, nonlinear prob-
lems. Systems and linear thinking differ in several 
important respects, as shown in Table 1 (see, for 
example, Senge, 1990).
For example, a linear approach to starvation 
might lead donors to assume that sending food 
aid solves the problem. However, thinking about 
“When you are confronted by any 
complex social system … with things 
about it that you’re dissatisfied with 
and anxious to fix, you cannot just 
step in and set about fixing with 
much hope of helping. This is one of 
the sore discouragements of our time”
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it in a systemic way would raise concerns about 
such unintended consequences of food aid as 
depressed local food prices that deter local agri-
cultural development and leave a country even 
more vulnerable to food shortages in the future. 
From a systemic view, temporary food aid only 
exacerbates the problem in the long run unless it 
is coupled with supports for local agriculture. 
Because the problems addressed by foundations 
are largely systemic, one step they can take to 
increase the social return on their grantmaking 
investments is to think systemically (vs. linearly).
The Basic Tools of Systems Thinking
There are several complementary approaches 
to systems thinking, including general systems 
theory (see, for example, Bertalanffy, 1968), 
dynamic feedback (see, for example, Senge, 1990), 
and complex adaptive systems (see, for example, 
Zimmerman, Lindberg, & Plsek, 1998). This ar-
ticle focuses on dynamic feedback and introduces 
such tools as
1. The iceberg — a tool for distinguishing prob-
lem symptoms from root causes
2. Reinforcing and balancing feedback
3. Mental models — what people believe or as-
sume to be true
4. System purpose and goals
5. Archetypes — recurring stories or patterns 
that stimulate insight into more complex 
dynamics.
They are not difficult to learn and may shape a 
more impactful grantmaking process.
Tool 1: The Iceberg
Linear thinking tends to mask the nonobvious 
relationships between problem symptoms and 
causes that complex systems exhibit. The iceberg 
is a simple tool for distinguishing symptoms 
from causes. As shown in Figure 1, it distin-
guishes three levels of insight — each of which 
is informed by a specific question and prompts a 
certain type of action or response.
We often focus our attention on responding to 
individual events. We want to know what is hap-
pening and react quickly to the crisis at hand. For 
example, the untimely death of a homeless person 
or appearance of people asking for money or food 
TABLE 1 Distinguishing Linear Thinking from Systems Thinking
Dimension Linear thinking Systems thinking
Causality There is a direct connection 
between problem symptoms 
and their underlying causes.
System performance is largely determined by 
interdependencies among system elements that are 
indirect, circular, and nonobvious.
Time A policy that achieves short-
term success ensures long-
term success.
The unintended and delayed consequences of most 
quick fixes neutralize or reverse immediate gains over 
time. 
Responsibility Most problems are caused by 
external factors beyond our 
control. 
Because actions taken by one group often have 
delayed negative consequences on its own 
performance as well as the behavior of others, 
each group tends to unwittingly contribute to the 
very problems it tries to solve and to undermine the 
effectiveness of others.
Strategy To improve the performance of 
the whole, we must improve 
the performance of its parts.
To improve the performance of the whole, we must 
improve relationships among the parts.
Tackle many independent 
initiatives simultaneously to 
improve all the parts. 
Identify a few key interdependencies that have the 
greatest leverage on system-wide performance 
(a.k.a. leverage points) and shift them in a sustained, 
coordinated way over time. 
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in a downtown area might temporarily increase 
community pressure to solve the homelessness 
problem. Alternatively, natural disasters such 
as Hurricane Katrina, the Indonesian tsunami, 
or a major drought call for rapid deployment of 
resources to save lives and property. Yet as we see 
in the food aid example, how we respond to a crisis 
can have an enormous impact on the long-term 
health of the people we help. These impacts are not 
necessarily obvious unless we think them through.
Sometimes we step back from individual events 
long enough to recognize ongoing trends or pat-
terns. We ask what has been happening over time 
and try to anticipate the future based on the past. 
Trends can often be surprising and disturbing. 
For example, efforts to reduce homelessness in 
Calhoun County had leveled off despite the fact 
that the estimated number of homeless people 
continued to increase. Moreover, visibility of the 
problem as measured by civic and media atten-
tion had declined over many years even though 
the problem continued to worsen. This disturbing 
pattern is summarized in Figure 2.
In the face of such patterns, we want to know why 
the problem persists and permanently change the 
trends to ensure a significant and lasting decline 
in homelessness. The root causes of a chronic, 
complex problem can be found in its underlying 
System Structure — the many circular, interde-
pendent, and sometimes time-delayed relation-
ships among its parts. The structure includes both 
easily observable components — such as current 
pressures, policies, and power dynamics — and 
less obvious factors such as perceptions and 
purposes (goals or intentions) that influence how 
these components affect behavior.
In the homelessness example, people’s percep-
tions (mental models, mind-sets, beliefs, and 
assumptions) included the following:
Many people are homeless because they want •	
to be.
We are working as hard as we can to help •	
people who are homeless.
Funds must be directed toward the most visible •	
problems.
The actual intention of the shelter and emergency 
services system was to temporarily reduce the 
problem’s visibility and severity without address-
ing the underlying causes of socioeconomic pres-
FIGURE 1 The Iceberg
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sure coupled with personal vulnerability that gave 
rise to the problem. The system was not designed 
to end homelessness despite the espoused efforts 
of many to do so. 
Hence, a second leverage point for foundations 
is to use the iceberg to dig below more obvious 
events and trends in order to clarify the system 
structures at the root cause of complex, chronic 
problems.
Tool 2: Reinforcing and Balancing Feedback
Reinforcing and balancing feedback are the two 
basic circular structures that describe how sys-
tems evolve over time. More complex dynamics 
result from combinations of these two feedback 
structures.
Reinforcing feedback is the basis for what we 
know as virtuous and vicious cycles. It explains 
the development of both engines of growth (a.k.a. 
flywheels) as well as spiraling deterioration. For 
example, Jim Collins has applied the flywheel 
concept he introduced in his book Good to Great 
(Collins, 2001) to suggesting how social sector 
organizations can develop their own engines of 
success (Collins, 2005, pp. 23–28). He believes 
that success in the social sector hinges on the 
ability to grow organizations (not just programs) 
by building a brand that attracts support that 
yields demonstrable results and in turn strength-
ens the brand. Collins also points out that the 
same reinforcing dynamic can produce the 
opposite effect, as when an organization that 
performs poorly weakens its brand reputation, 
which makes it more difficult to attract resources 
and drives results down even further. Several 
overlapping vicious cycles in the homelessness 
case explain how the number of people at risk of 
becoming homeless tended to increase over time, 
and how homelessness could coexist with vacant 
housing (see Figure 3).
Most people are accustomed to thinking of 
growth as a linear process. However, reinforcing 
feedback describes a more common process in 
social and economic systems — that of expo-
nential growth where a quantity increases by a 
constant percentage of the whole in a constant 
time period. Such phenomena as increases in 
savings and population are familiar illustrations 
of exponential processes. Foundations seeking a 
long-term return on their grantmaking invest-
ments benefit from cultivating critical mass or 
tipping points that build sustainable momentum 
in a social system (Ball, 2006; Gladwell, 2000).
The following French riddle points out several 
important implications of exponential growth 
(Meadows, Meadows, Randers, & Behrens, 
1972). Imagine a lily pond where the lily plant 
doubles in size every day, and the pond is totally 
covered by the lily in 30 days. When is the pond 
half-covered? The answer, which is surprising for 
many people, is 29 days; that is, half of the pond is 
covered just one day before the pond is complete-
ly blanketed by the lily. How much of the pond is 
covered in 15 days? The answer here is 0.0025%; 
that is, half-way into the month the lily is barely 
noticeable.
The exponential nature of organic growth has 
several consequences for foundation decision 
making. First, most people tend to expect to see 
FIGURE 2 Trends in Addressing Homelessness
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improvements faster than they are capable of 
developing. Expecting the system to shift quickly 
can lead to unrealistic demands for growth that 
ultimately slow improvement down if not kill it 
entirely. Alternatively, people can miss or misin-
terpret small improvements and give up prema-
turely on supporting a change that takes time to 
manifest. Figure 4 depicts the exponential nature 
of organic reinforcing growth and contrasts it 
with the more typical linear assumption people 
hold about how things should grow.
Second, a success engine or flywheel is built not 
only on the individual factors that contribute to 
growth, but also on how these factors interact 
to reinforce each other over time. For example, 
successful micro-lending programs integrate 
community involvement, peer support, finan-
cial investment, economic results, job creation, 
and community reinvestment in ever-expanding 
spirals. An implication for foundation managers 
might be that they evaluate grantee plans based on 
the clarity and soundness of their structural design 
— how the parts fit together — rather than on the 
individual elements themselves. It can be helpful 
to notice that one approach to increasing the ef-
fectiveness of a theory of change is to explain how 
parts of the system are intended to interact in both 
direct and indirect ways over time.
Third, because exponential growth also applies 
to seemingly trivial problems getting much 
worse over time, it is important to monitor such 
problems early on and consider addressing them 
rapidly instead of hoping they go away. For ex-
ample, the “broken windows theory” suggests that 
community instability is catalyzed by disorderly 
conditions (Kelling and Wilson, 1982). The theory 
is based on research showing that a car in good 
condition in a poor neighborhood would be van-
dalized only after one window had been broken. 
It has led police departments around the country 
to control minor misbehaviors and maintain a 
clean environment to prevent major crimes from 
occurring (Johnson, 2009).
Hence, a third leverage point for foundations is 
to cultivate engines of growth slowly and break 
potential vicious cycles quickly.
Balancing feedback is the second foundational 
structure in complex systems. It is the core 
dynamic of problem-solving or goal-seeking 
behavior. We recognize it in our daily experi-
ence, for example, when we balance our needs for 
activity and replenishment by eating when we get 
hungry or sleeping to refresh ourselves. In con-
trast to reinforcing feedback loops that amplify 
an existing condition, balancing feedback seeks 
FIGURE 3 Deterioration of Affordable Housing
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to correct or reverse a current state to bridge the 
gap between actual and desired performance. For 
example, a foundation might fund a mentoring 
program between older and younger students to 
improve graduation rates or a counseling pro-
gram to reduce teen pregnancy. When balancing 
feedback accomplishes a desired goal, the correc-
tive process often becomes invisible. When we eat 
enough food or get enough sleep, we tend to take 
these functions for granted. Alternatively, founda-
tions might terminate funding for a program that 
appears successful and divert funds to meet a 
more pressing need.
By contrast, we are more aware of balancing 
processes when a system is not accomplishing 
the goal we state for it. In other words, balanc-
ing feedback also helps explain why systems 
do not change despite people’s best efforts to 
improve them. Simple corrective processes fail 
to function as intended in at least one of three 
ways.
First, we often stop investing in the solution once 
a problem appears solved. This act of “taking the 
pressure off” often leads the problem to recur — 
much to the frustration of the problem solvers. 
For example, urban youth crime in Boston was a 
serious problem in the early 1990s. Political and 
community leaders banded together to develop 
numerous coordinated solutions in response,  for 
instance, community policing, neighborhood 
watches, gang outreach, and after-school pro-
grams. When youth crime declined as a result, 
political leaders felt obligated to shift funds to 
more obviously pressing problems. As a result, 
they gradually began to cut back on the crime 
prevention programs that worked so well, and the 
problem returned (Fox, 2003).
The second tendency is to fail to appreciate the 
time required to effect change. For example, a 
recent success story on curbing teen drinking and 
substance abuse in one Massachusetts commu-
nity of 46,000 where adults also exhibited above 
average rates of alcohol and drug abuse described 
how coordinated improvements had gradually 
taken hold over a period of 11 years (Moscowitz, 
2008). Such patience and persistence is rare. Nor-
mal reactions in the face of time delay are either 
to become impatient and push for premature 
results or to give up too quickly.
The third way in which balancing loops can fail 
to correct an existing situation is when there is 
lack of agreement on the goals of the system, the 
current level of performance and what drives it, 
or both. For example, a report sponsored by the 
Ball Foundation noted there is no lack of edu-
cational innovation in selected U.S. schools and 
school districts (Institute on Education and the 
Economy, 1995). However, educators seeking 
to disseminate these innovations on a broader 
scale were confronted by serious disagreements 
about both the goals of K–12 education and cur-
rent performance levels.1 Some school districts 
defined their goals in terms of test scores, while 
others viewed graduation, subsequent employ-
ment, or the motivation and capacity for continu-
ous learning as the desired result. Similarly, these 
school districts measured actual performance 
1 The author wishes to thank Jennifer Kemeny and Sherry 
Immediato for this insight based on their work in the 
project.
FIGURE 4 Lessons From the Lily Pond
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differently in terms of test scores, how children 
performed after graduation, and indicators of 
creativity and self-directed learning. It is very dif-
ficult to define and disseminate a particular strat-
egy when the desired future, system goals, and/or 
perceptions of current conditions are ambiguous 
or conflicted. By contrast, anchoring the system 
in a common picture of the desired state (for 
example, through shared visioning) and a com-
mon understanding of current reality and why it 
persists (for example, through systems thinking) 
builds creative tension that aligns and propels the 
efforts of multiple stakeholders (Senge, 1990). 
These insights about balancing loops point to 
three additional leverage points that foundations 
might focus on:
In order to reduce the risk of taking the pres-•	
sure off, ensure that effective solutions are 
reinforced and can be sustained over time.
Respect time delays: •	 be patient and persistent 
in your grantmaking.
Establish a clear and compelling shared vision, •	
joint goals, and a common understanding of 
current reality before developing strategy.
Tool 3: Mental Models
Mental models encompass what people believe 
or assume to be true. They are often described as 
paradigms, mind-sets, beliefs, assumptions, cul-
tural narratives, norms, expectations, or simply 
perceptions. Mental models significantly impact 
how people behave and perform. For example, 
the “shelter mentality” in Calhoun County turned 
out to be such a significant factor in perpetuat-
ing homelessness that the 10-year plan to end 
homelessness identified shifting people’s mind-
set to valuing a comprehensive array of support, 
housing, and employment services as one of 
their top goals. Other critical mental models that 
needed to be addressed included “Many people 
are homeless because they want to be” and 
“Funds must be directed towards the most visible 
problems.”
While mental models are necessary to help us 
simplify the world, they are inherently limited 
and can often become outmoded as conditions 
change. To ensure that current mental models are 
still relevant and useful, foundation staff might do 
the following:
Surface current beliefs held by system stake-•	
holders, including people in the foundation.
Test the utility rather than validity of these •	
beliefs,  that is, determine if the beliefs help 
people achieve the results they really want 
instead of whether or not they are true.
Encourage stakeholders to expand their views •	
by supporting them to learn from each other.
Point out disconfirming data that challenges •	
the validity of current beliefs.
Consider how existing data might be interpret-•	
ed differently, for example, by accounting for 
time delays or the tendency to take the pressure 
off of a “solved” problem.
Help people clarify the future they want to cre-•	
ate and define new beliefs or assumptions that 
support them to achieve it.
Establish experiment(s) that people can run to •	
test the viability of these new beliefs and as-
sumptions.
The influence of mental models can direct foun-
dations to another leverage point: clarify and shift 
mental models that influence the way the system 
operates.
Tool 4: Purpose
A foundational principle in systems thinking is that 
a system is exquisitely designed to achieve its cur-
rent purpose. This principle has two implications:
It is important to understand the payoffs of •	
the status quo no matter how dysfunctional it 
appears to be
The influence of mental models 
can direct foundations to another 
leverage point: clarify and shift 
mental models that influence the 
way the system operates.
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System goals are more effective when they tar-•	
get desired results instead of expected effort.
First, a core reason that systems resist change 
is that the purpose achieved by the current sys-
tem — as defined by its vision, mission, values, 
goals, and/or metrics — is more compelling 
than its espoused purpose. For example, com-
munity leaders in Calhoun County pursued goals 
of reducing the visibility of homelessness and 
temporarily easing people’s pain through shelters 
even though they espoused a goal of permanently 
ending homelessness. Any one stakeholder in a 
system can undermine its own ability to achieve 
espoused goals because it holds competing goals 
without recognizing the discrepancy (Kegan & 
Lahey, 2001). Conflicting goals can also be held 
by different stakeholders in the system — as 
when Israeli settlers and Islamist extremists hold 
goals of one unified religious state west of the 
Jordan River while the majority of the popula-
tions on both sides favor a two-state solution 
(Stroh, 2002 ).
In order for people to reconcile what they say 
they want the system to accomplish with what 
it actually is accomplishing, people have two 
basic choices. The ideal solution is to realize both 
purposes simultaneously. For example, it is pos-
sible to design homeless shelter services in a way 
that simultaneously supports people to achieve 
permanent housing. However, the both/and solu-
tion is often not feasible either because focusing 
on short-term goals frequently undermines the 
system’s ability to achieve long-term goals or 
because certain goals are inherently incompat-
ible. The alternative under these circumstances is 
to consciously choose one of the two intentions 
and primarily focus on this result. In the case of 
Calhoun County, community leaders consciously 
chose creating permanent, safe, affordable, and 
supportive housing rather than coping with 
homelessness as their purpose going forward.
Second, because it is often easier to measure 
effort than results, people tend to create systems 
that utilize a lot of resources for questionable 
outcomes. Well-known systems theorist Donella 
Meadows explains:
If the desired system state is good education, mea-
suring that goal by the amount of money spent per 
student will ensure money spent per student. If the 
quality of education is measure by performance on 
standardized tests, the system will produce perfor-
mance on standardized tests. Whether either of these 
measures is correlated with good education is at least 
worth thinking about. (Meadows, 2008, p. 138)
In the case of Calhoun County, measuring pre-
vention of homelessness is more difficult than 
measuring either temporary care or resettlement 
in permanent housing. However, it has been 
estimated that one dollar spent on prevention is 
worth six dollars required to house people who 
have become homeless. Success in reducing the 
risk of homelessness might be difficult to evalu-
ate, but risk reduction is very effective.
The implication for foundations is to distinguish 
and reconcile desired results with current out-
comes and metrics.
Tool 5: System Archetypes
Most complex problems arise from combinations 
of many reinforcing and/or balancing feedback 
processes. The good news is that we can gain 
preliminary insight into a wide range of dynam-
ics by learning a dozen or so system archetypes 
or classic stories. The archetypes are recurring 
patterns that appear in many different situations. 
They are well-understood, easily transferable 
across different system contexts, and often serve 
as catalysts for discerning even more complex 
dynamics (Kim, 1993).
One of the most common archetypes is the story 
of Shifting the Burden (to the Quick Fix). This is 
the basic archetype of unintended dependency 
The implication for foundations is 
to distinguish and reconcile desired 
results with current outcomes and 
metrics.
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or addiction. The dynamic describes a situa-
tion where people are aware of a long-term, 
fundamental solution to a problem symptom. 
However, they choose to implement a quick fix 
instead because it is easier to do so and in fact 
temporarily relieves the problem symptom. 
Over time, continuous dependence on the quick 
fix makes it increasingly difficult to implement 
the long-term solution even if people wanted 
to. As a result the problem symptom gradually 
gets worse. Addiction to shelters and emergency 
services constituted a core dynamic in perpetuat-
ing homelessness in Calhoun County (see detail 
in the next section). Other examples include 
countries that become addicted to food aid while 
undermining the more fundamental response of 
local agriculture development, African villages 
that became dependent on the government to 
fix wells the government had installed, and our 
nation’s dependence on prisons instead of com-
munity socioeconomic development to reduce 
urban crime.
Other common archetypes include Fixes That 
Backfire — the story of unintended consequences, 
Limits to Growth — the story of unanticipated 
constraints, Tragedy of the Commons — the story 
of optimizing the parts in a way that destroys the 
whole, and Accidental Adversaries — the story of 
partners who become enemies. An example of a 
Fix That Backfires occurs when drug busts take 
criminals off the street and thus reduce drug-
related crime in the short run, but also remove 
drugs from circulation, thereby increasing drug 
prices and requiring addicts to steal more to pay 
for the reduced supply in the long run (Fried-
man, 1976). Foundations often face the challenge 
of Limits to Growth when they find it difficult to 
help their grantees scale up a successful ex-
perimental program. Tragedy of the Commons 
manifests in the overgrazing of such shared 
environmental resources as fisheries, water, and 
air. Nonprofit, public, and private sector organi-
zations that seek to benefit from collaborating to 
solve a shared problem risk becoming Accidental 
Adversaries when they focus on the blind spots 
and shortcomings of their respective partners 
instead of building on each others’ strengths.
The implication for foundations is to look for ar-
chetypal patterns of behavior that begin to explain 
why a complex problem persists.
Applying the Systems Approach
Implementing the systems approach involves:
1. Building a strong foundation for change by 
engaging multiple stakeholders to identify an 
initial vision and picture of current reality
2. Engaging stakeholders to explain their often 
competing views of why a chronic, complex 
problem persists despite people’s best efforts 
to solve it
3. Integrating the diverse perspectives into a 
map that provides a multipartial and more 
complete picture of the system and root 
causes of the problem
4. Supporting people to see how their well-
intended efforts to solve the problem often 
make the problem worse
5. Affirming a compelling vision of the future 
and supportive strategies that can lead to 
sustainable, system-wide change.
For example, in the homelessness case, the local 
Homeless Coalition had been meeting for many 
years to end homelessness. Their shared desire 
to serve the homeless had been undermined by 
disagreements about alternative solutions, com-
petition for limited funds, and limited knowledge 
about best practices. Although many understood 
the importance of a collective effort to provide 
critical services, housing, and jobs to both home-
less people and those at risk of losing their homes, 
they were unable to generate the collective will 
and capacity to implement such an approach. They 
lacked a shared vision of the future they wanted 
to create, an understanding of current reality, 
The implication for foundations is 
to look for archetypal patterns of 
behavior that begin to explain why 
a complex problem persists.
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and a common appreciation of how they were all 
contributing to that reality. Finally, the promise of 
state funding if they could agree on a 10-year plan 
to end homelessness, the provision of funding for 
developing the plan by local donors, and the use of 
a team of consultants experienced in community 
development, systems thinking, and national best 
housing practices enabled them to break through 
years of frustrated attempts.
The Coalition with the help of consultants en-
listed and organized the support of community 
leaders across the nonprofit, public, and private 
sectors along with themselves and representatives 
from the homeless population. They established a 
set of committees and task forces as well as a clear 
and detailed planning process. While they began 
by articulating a shared vision of ending home-
lessness, they would not be able to really commit 
to this result until they fully understood the sys-
tem dynamics that perpetuated the problem. My 
colleague Michael Goodman and I were brought 
in specifically to apply systems thinking to (1) 
understand the dynamics of local homelessness, 
(2) determine why the problem persisted despite 
people’s best efforts to solve it, and (3) identify 
high-leverage interventions that could shift these 
dynamics and serve as the basis for a 10-year 
plan. Through interviews with all key stakehold-
ers, we analyzed a number of interdependent 
factors that led people to become homeless in 
the first place, get off the street temporarily, and 
find it so difficult to secure safe, supportive, and 
affordable permanent housing.
We learned that the most ironic obstacle to 
implementing the fundamental solution was the 
community’s very success in providing temporary 
shelters and supports. These shelters and supports 
had led to several unintended consequences. One 
was that they reduced the visibility of the problem 
to the community overall. The low visibility was 
compounded by the facts that (1) many people 
were naturally reluctant to see the problem in the 
first place, (2) people who were homeless were 
also fearful of being seen and hid their condi-
tion as best they could, and (3) there was a lack 
of accurate data about the extent of the problem. 
The overall lack of visibility reduced community 
pressure to solve the problem and create a differ-
ent future.
The temporary success of shelters and other pro-
visional supports also tended to reinforce funding 
to individual organizations for their current work. 
Donors played a role in buttressing existing fund-
ing patterns through their pressure to demon-
strate short-term success. Such reinforcement 
FIGURE 5 Shifting the Burden to Temporary Shelters
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decreased the service providers’ willingness, time, 
and funding to innovate and collaborate. This in 
turn led to
Fragmentation of services•	
Competition for existing funds •	
Lack of deeper knowledge of best practices•	
Reluctance to overcome government restric-•	
tions that made it difficult to innovate
A shelter mentality.•	
The community’s collective ability to implement 
the fundamental solution was undermined as a 
result. The essence of these dynamics is described 
in Figure 5.
Because archetypal dynamics are recurring and 
we understand what causes them, we also know a 
lot about the leverage points that help shift them. 
There are three proven interventions to transform 
the Shifting the Burden archetype:
1. Reduce dependence on the quick fix, often by 
exploring the mental models that influence 
their use
2. Build shared vision among key stakeholders 
that motivates people to implement the more 
fundamental solution 
3. To the extent that people must rely in part 
on the quick fix, seek to apply it in a way that 
makes it easier (not harder) to implement the 
fundamental solution.
For example, in the homelessness case, we helped 
the county define goals based on these interven-
tions that formed the basis for a 10-year plan 
subsequently approved by the state:
Challenge the shelter mentality and end fund-•	
ing for more shelters
Develop a community vision where all citizens •	
have permanent, safe, affordable, and support-
ive housing 
Align the strategies and resources of all stake-•	
holders including funders in service of this 
vision
Redesign shelter and provisional support •	
programs to provide more effective bridges to 
critical services, housing, and employment.
Two years later the county continues to make 
progress toward these goals. The program has 
an executive director, in-kind funding for space 
and supplies, additional funding focused on 
long-term strategies, and a community-wide 
board supported by  eight committees underway 
TABLE 2 Leverage Points
1. Think systemically (vs. linearly) to be strategic
2. Dig below obvious events and trends to clarify system structures at the root cause of complex, 
chronic problems
3. Cultivate engines of growth slowly and break vicious cycles quickly
4. Ensure that effective solutions are reinforced and can be sustained over time
5. Respect time delays: be patient and persistent
6. Establish a clear and compelling shared vision, joint goals, and a common understanding of current 
reality before developing strategy
7. Clarify and shift mental models that influence the way the system currently operates
8. Distinguish and reconcile desired results with current outcomes and metrics 
9. Look for archetypal patterns of behavior that begin to explain why a complex problem persists
10. Reduce dependence on quick fixes and develop shared vision in support of a fundamental solution
11. Incorporate movement toward the fundamental solution into quick fixes that cannot be avoided
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with clear charters producing monthly reports 
on their goals. A community-wide eviction pre-
vention policy was changed to enable people to 
stay in their homes longer, and a street outreach 
program is going well to place people into hous-
ing. 
The implications of the Shifting the Burden 
dynamic for foundations committed to funding 
fundamental solutions are to reduce dependence 
on quick fixes, develop shared vision in support of 
the fundamental solution, and incorporate move-
ment toward the fundamental solution into quick 
fixes that cannot be eliminated.
A summary of all 11 leverage points appears in 
Table 2.
Summary and Conclusions
Good intentions are not sufficient to produce 
positive outcomes. This is especially important 
because nonobvious system dynamics often 
seduce us into doing what is expedient but ulti-
mately ineffective.
At the heart of systems thinking is the ability to 
trace a problem from how it often manifests in 
the form of a specific event or a disturbing trend 
to determining and addressing its underlying root 
causes. This involves defining the various com-
ponents of systems structure: formal elements 
such as pressures, policies, and power dynam-
ics as well as more informal yet often governing 
aspects such as perceptions (or mental models) 
and purpose (or goals). It is especially useful to 
clarify how these components interact. The ana-
lytic tools of reinforcing and balancing feedback 
as well as frequently recurring system archetypes 
provide catalysts for understanding the often 
nonobvious interdependencies that shape system 
performance over time.
System behavior changes as a result of making a 
few, key coordinated changes over time. Based 
on this introduction to how dynamic systems 
function, the article has identified a five-step 
change process and  11 leverage points for 
achieving sustainable, system-wide improve-
ment.
Despite the many benefits of this approach, it 
is also important to recognize the challenges 
foundations might face in implementing it. Sys-
tems thinking urges us to expand our horizons 
of time — approaching what we do in the short 
term within a clear long-term context — and 
space — engaging many diverse stakeholders as 
partners in a continuous learning process. Part 
2 of this article will help foundations meet these 
challenges by suggesting ways in which they can 
align their programming approaches and systems 
with the dynamics of how complex social systems 
behave and evolve.
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